I don’t have time to post a long entry about the increasingly inevitable war on Iraq. I will briefly say that I don’t believe that a case has been made, and I think Powell’s speech even detracted from the evidence. I mean, we’re shown pictures of trucks and cranes, and expected to trust the Americans that they’re being used to create WMD. That’s drawing a very long bow, I must say.
Then we’ve got the outdated, plagiarised British dossier. If the British or American intelligence agencies had any real evidence of Iraq developing WMD or threatening its neighbours and the world, we would be shown more than stolen extracts of a student’s paper of ten years ago.
The most disturbing element of the proposed war remains its aftermath. Ken Parish recovers from his recent hawkish lurch with a very centrist response to the prospect of increased US hegemon. He raises a very pertinent question:
I wonder how many opponents of the Iraq military option would actually support it if it weren’t for the fact that they perceive (like Hugh White) that the major consequence (besides freeing Iraqis from an appalling tyrant) will be the semi-permanent entrenchment of the US as world hyperpower.
I can’t say for sure that I would support the war, but the prospect of a United States that is prepared to invade any country that it decides (for whatever reason, based on genuine evidence or not) is a threat to its interests, is one major reason that I oppose the war. The notion of “pre-emptive self-defence” is farcical in the case of Iraq. Even if it had WMD, it poses no threat to anyone farther afield than Israel, who already possess WMD and have regularly declared their preparedness to use them.
In fact, one of the concerns I have regularly raised when discussing this issue is the notion that Iraq has been chosen as a soft target for America’s redefinition of international law. After all, we have unfinished business with Saddam Hussein, he’s Arab, he treats his own people badly. We can make some tenuous connections between him and Osama bin Laden, even if they don’t stand up to scrutiny; and we can steal from grad students to pretend he has WMD. Once we’ve taken him out, we have a precedent to move on to other nations, as the fancy takes us.
Daniel Pipes thinks this is both legitimate and worthwhile. Ken respectfully disagrees. Pipes’ suggestion is quite disturbing, given that the outcome is less likely to be democracy and more likely to be mutual backscratching deals with whoever’s at hand.
Having said that, we need to do more than oppose war. Reform of the UN is vital if we are going to have a viable alternative method of dispute resolution. Ken notes that this needs to begin with the abolition of the veto:
I think we need to start some lateral thinking about other ways to engineer workable constraints on hegemonic power, while still allowing enough scope for decisive action against tyranny in clear-cut cases. Of course, the question of who should judge whether a given situation is sufficiently exceptional to justify military intervention is a dilemma to which I don’t have an immediate solution. A UNSC without any nation enjoying a veto might help, but the chances of any of the current permanent members (especially the US) agreeing to surrender their veto power is very remote.
I was chatting to a couple of people today, and the thought struck me (as it does occasionally) that this war is probably inevitable. From there, I tried to think of a least-worst case scenario for its trigger, and I think it is this: the Security Council succumbs to US pressure and votes for war. However, one nation exercises a veto (preferably China, as it would be bad for France to oppose the US as their hegemony becomes ever more complete).
This would lead to a war waged in accordance with the vote of the Security Council but against a veto. The result (apart from a violent, bloody and inhumane holocaust of innocent Iraqi civilians) would be an ultimatum for the international community — abolish the veto or let the UN fade into absolute irrelevance in the face of US arrogance and imperialism.