Abortion again…
I mentioned in my previous post on abortion that while I considered two weeks an absolute minimum time in which abortion is moral, I was open to evidence that showed that a longer period could be allowed. My position was not a rock solid one — I had been convinced by Dr Carnley that the prospect of “twinning” rendered personhood an impossibility, but hadn’t looked at the arguments about the later development of the prenate.
I support the right of families to withdraw life support from loved ones, and I don’t believe it is murder. I think they are withdrawing artificial support from a person who is already dead. On that basis, I set out to read about when doctors consider death to occur, and to apply that definition to the other end of a person’s life.
It’s bloody hard to find good information about the medical evidence that underpins either pro-choice or anti-abortion arguments. The former camp’s websites tend to ignore the foetus and concentrate on the mother, while the latter camp tries to pass off photos of human-looking prenates as evidence of their personhood.
Eventually I came across religioustolerance.org’s When does human personhood begin?, which canvasses various different arguments on the issue. From there, I found another page about an abortion rationale based on the definition of death — exactly what I was after, but hardly enough detail to form a real basis for judgment. It seems to follow Richard Carrier, and a bit of hunting uncovered a debate he participated in, “On the Issue of Abortion”. It is a debate between Carrier and Jen Roth, who are both secularists — which means it doesn’t just descend into biblical nonsense, and is worth reading no matter what you think about abortion.
The crux of Carrier’s argument is that personality relies on complex cerebral function. Interestingly, he discusses “twinning” in this context, and takes it much further than Carnley:
[T]he fetus does not become truly neurologically active until the fifth month (an event we call “quickening”). This activity might only be a generative one, i.e. the spontaneous nerve pulses could merely be autonomous or spontaneous reflexes aimed at stimulating and developing muscle and organ tissue. Nevertheless, it is in this month that a complex cerebral cortex, the one unique feature of human — in contrast with animal — brains, begins to develop, and is typically complete, though still growing, by the sixth month. What is actually going on mentally at that point is unknown, but the hardware is in place for a human mind to exist in at least a primitive state.
[...]
Until the 20th week … there is no complex cerebral cortex and no major central nervous activity. That is a condition universally regarded as a state of death in adults. An adult human being in such a state cannot really be “killed,” just unplugged. And such an act would not be disrespectful of their individual existence because that existence has already ceased, and only a body remains. Even if we were able to regenerate a brain-dead patient’s cerebral cortex, using the genetic blueprint in her cells, we would still fail to resurrect her. We would instead merely create an identical twin inside a used body, with an infantile mind and no memories, no complex personality traits, and no intellectual skills. Although this fresh brain would be ready to learn and develop anew, it would be a different person. None of the unique features of the deceased would exist any more — the only mental features that would survive are the very same features that would be shared by any natural identical twins.
The fetus before quickening is in the very same state as this hypothetical regenerated person. And the analogy of identical twins is a crucial one. Twins share the exact same blueprint for brain and body, and there is nothing “individual” about a blueprint that can be shared by more than one individual person — their individuality does not derive from their blueprint, but from their unique personal development, which begins almost certainly before birth, but without any doubt upon birth, when there can be no mistake that novel sensory data has begun transforming the brain and educating it in unique ways. None of this individualization can occur before the existence of a complex cortex that can be individualized (pre-fifth-month) — certainly none before there is a central nerve organ of any kind (pre-third-month).
As the debate continues, it is clear that Roth does not share Carrier’s view as to what constitutes an “individual human person”. Unfortunately, she doesn’t go into a great amount of detail as to what she believes that term means, and as a result, I did not find her version very convincing.
For example, she claims that the process of twinning is “not particularly relevant to the public policy debate” about abortion; I obviously disagree. She also states that “it is not true that the body is merely an empty shell before the 20th week, passively awaiting the addition of an individual personality. The body has been directing the development of the brain all along, according to the instructions encoded in its DNA — and with modifying influences from the external environment.” True, but until the cerebral cortex is formed and firing, the foetus has many but not all of the conditions required to be a human person.
When she tries to find a clearer formulation, Roth ties herself in knots, first saying that “reason and moral choice are less arbitrary criteria on which to base personhood” and then admitting “the prenate is not yet able to exercise reason or moral choice”. She then falls back on the idea that “[t]he organism is identical (in the mathematical sense) over the course of his/her entire lifetime” from conception to death. However, it is not clear why a dead body, especially one that is being sustained by a life support machine, would not be considered identical in the mathematical sense — it has the same cells, the same DNA. The only difference is the lack of cerebral function, which the early prenate also lacks.
Roth’s weakness on this point is demonstrated in her final rebuttal:
My third point is that the personality is not a separate entity, existing independently of the human organism. To say, as Mr. Carrier has, that an individual does not exist prior to the 20th week is to say that the personality is the individual. (Ironically, the idea that the personality is an entity unto itself is one I would expect to hear from a believer in the supernatural. I am currently unaware of any atheistic philosophers who embrace mind/body dualism.) It is, instead, a property of the individual. The human organism itself builds the brain structures necessary for the formation of the personality, and thus can hardly be said to come into existence only after those brain structures have been built.
She’s correct to say that personality is a property of an individual person, but she doesn’t seem to understand that it is a necessary property. Before the brain is sufficiently developed, personality does not exist and the foetus is a human organism. Afterwards, all of the necessary properties are present and the foetus becomes a human person. When Carrier continues to challenge her definition, Roth asserts that “[t]he size and strength of the pro-life movement attest” to her correctness. Wowee. I’m convinced.
Okay, so by now I’m thoroughly convinced that the human person is formed at the point when cerebral function is acheived. But when does that occur? Carrier claims that it is during the fifth month, which seems to be generally accepted.
So, I’m going to modify my position. Take my previous entry on this issue and change the time limit to twenty weeks.
(Interestingly, “quickening” used to mean the point at which the mother could feel the foetus kicking. As Norman pointed out, the Church used to accept abortions up to that point, as it was the earliest point at which one could prove that the foetus was alive. It’s amazing how the scientific evidence can come full circle… if only the Church would follow.)
Holy crap, Rob – twenty weeks is a really long time.
My attitude towards abortion has changed dramatically in the last year or so, but I cannot see that abortion at twenty weeks is justified.
I think that there is another point that people seem to be missing. Abortion has more to do, I believe, with the right to be kept alive, as opposed to the right to life. These are different things.
The woman’s right to choose is important, not because she has the power to decide whether or not the foetus has a right to life. It it because it is her right to choose to KEEP the foetus alive or not. It is different to murder.
Carita, yes, I know twenty weeks is a long time. But I’m not coming from a time-maximising point of view — I think we have an obligation to err on the side of caution.
Amanda, I’m not sure I buy that argument; I’ll respond in more detail when I get a chance later.
I’d like to be able to believe that this was the biggest problem which is going to be facing our nation, not to mention our species, in the not too distant future. Having made what increasingly looks like a timely choice for my year of birth, unless I live as long as some of my relatives seem to have managed, I have an excellent chance of departing this life before the worst of the proverbial excrement hits the fan.
For those of you who are still going to be here, I suspect there’ll be many issues far more pressing, and even more challenging, than abortion. Religious fads re what is “true” on this topic have changed in the past, and will change again. The one constant is likely to be an increasingly difficult and complex set of problems facing the planet as a whole, and [selfish as this may sound] this nation in particular.
Where is YOUR time and energy best spent? Only you can decide that; but I’m not sure that the answer is grappling with the many conflicting values which criss-cross the abortion debate.
Maureen Condic uses your same argumentative strategy but comes to a different conclusion in Life: Defining the Beginning by the End.
Norman, I take your point. Abortion is not the most pressing problem facing Australia at the moment, and that’s not likely to change. However, does that mean we should not consider the issue?
Thanks for that, Emily. Condic adopts a different definition of death, which explains her different outcome. I’m not convinced by her arguments against “ability” as the determinant factor. She writes:
I don’t believe that’s the case. Until the cerebral function kicks in, the foetus is 0% person. Afterwards, it is 100% person, regardless of its intelligence, ability, etc. It remains 100% person until its brain ceases to function, whereupon it becomes 0% person again.
I also think her argument about humans in a persistent vegetative state is a bit confused — nobody is arguing that they are dead; rather that they are no longer a person. Being human, being alive, and being a person are three different concepts.
While I’m at it, I should mention that I’m now having problems with Peter Carnley’s argument. The prospect of cloning means that the prospect of twinning never really ends. As a result, his 14 day limit is entirely artificial, and a different basis for determining when a foetus becomes a person is necessary.
In a way Norman is right. The abortion debate is one where the majority of participants select their desired position first and then come up with argument ex post facto to justify them. Nonetheless Robert what you’re doing is very admirable and Norman is on the whole missing the point. Not everyone blogs to ’solve problems’ or to ‘change the world’. It was the people trying to ’solve problems’ and ‘change the world’ who got us into our current messes in the first place. I for one am long past that obsession and my postings reflect that. There’s nothing wrong with curiosity and inquiry for its own sake. If people manage to derive ideas from the issues that are explored that somehow ameliorate the human condition, well so much the better but there’s no imperative to do so. The world would be a much better place if more people spent it in quiet and disinterested contemplation.
“Until the cerebral function kicks in, the foetus is 0% person. Afterwards, it is 100% person, regardless of its intelligence, ability, etc. It remains 100% person until its brain ceases to function, whereupon it becomes 0% person again.”
This implies that there’s a moment in time, a dividing line, immediately before which the fetus is 0% person (and can be killed without violating a moral duty to protect innocent life?) and immediately after which the fetus is 100% person (and cannot be killed).
To the extent that your view of personhood rests on cerebral function, do you mean active cerebral function or potential cerebral function?
David Oderberg argues in “Applied Ethics” (Blackwell, 2000) that personhood arguments that rely on cerebral function are problematic because when adults are sleeping, drunk, drugged, in a coma, etc., they exhibit potential but not actual cerebral function. So either it is acceptable to kill sleeping (drunk, drugged) adults and fetuses–because neither of them exhibit active cerebral function–or it is not okay to kill human beings (including fetuses) who have the potential for complex cerebral activity but are not currently manifesting it.
Emily:
This implies that there’s a moment in time, a dividing line, immediately before which the fetus is 0% person (and can be killed without violating a moral duty to protect innocent life?) and immediately after which the fetus is 100% person (and cannot be killed).
I agree that the position is flawed, but no more so than the position that holds fertilization to be a similarly bright line that divides “0% personhood” from “100% personhood.”
David Oderberg argues in “Applied Ethics” (Blackwell, 2000) that personhood arguments that rely on cerebral function are problematic because when adults are sleeping, drunk, drugged, in a coma, etc., they exhibit potential but not actual cerebral function.
I think that’s a strawman argument. Nobody really believes that human beings cease to be persons when they are drunk or asleep. The sense in which a drunk person has the “potential” for “active cerebral function” is obviously very different from the sense in which a fetus does.
I think that there is another point that people seem to be missing. Abortion has more to do, I believe, with the right to be kept alive, as opposed to the right to life. These are different things. The woman’s right to choose is important, not because she has the power to decide whether or not the foetus has a right to life. It it because it is her right to choose to KEEP the foetus alive or not. It is different to murder.
Exactly. Even if one grants the implausible premise that a fetus is a person, it does not follow from that premise that abortion is murder, or even close to murder. In no area of the law is one person required to make an extraordinary sacrifice, a sacrifice even remotely comparable to enduring nine months of unwanted pregnancy and childbirth, in order to save or sustain the life of another person. That is why, for example, we do not require people to donate blood or tissue or organs to save the life of someone else, even their own child, and even if they are the only match.
I think that’s a strawman argument. Nobody really believes that human beings cease to be persons when they are drunk or asleep. The sense in which a drunk person has the “potential” for “active cerebral function” is obviously very different from the sense in which a fetus does.
If you look at a person in a coma, a person in certain stages of sleep, or a person under the influence of certain drugs (such as anaesthestic drugs), it doesn’t seem obvious that the potential for active cerebral function differs from that of a fetus. Perhaps you could describe why you see things this way in more detail. Also, if the two kinds of capacities or potentialities do differ to a significant extent, why does one kind of latent capacity confer the right to continued existence while the other kind of latent capacity doesn’t?
Emily:
If you look at a person in a coma, a person in certain stages of sleep, or a person under the influence of certain drugs (such as anaesthestic drugs), it doesn’t seem obvious that the potential for active cerebral function differs from that of a fetus. Perhaps you could describe why you see things this way in more detail.
Isn’t it obvious? A person who is asleep can wake up. A person who is under anaesthesia can be revived. And cerebral activity is present even in those altered states of consciousness, anyway. A fetus, in contrast, may not even possess the necessary brain tissue for any kind of mental process at all.
Also, if the two kinds of capacities or potentialities do differ to a significant extent, why does one kind of latent capacity confer the right to continued existence while the other kind of latent capacity doesn’t?
But the fetus may not have any latent capacity for cerebral activity at all. Unless it has reached a certain stage of development, it won’t have even a rudimentary cerebrum.
Emily:
Also, if the two kinds of capacities or potentialities do differ to a significant extent, why does one kind of latent capacity confer the right to continued existence while the other kind of latent capacity doesn’t?
The issue here isn’t “the right to continued existence,” it’s the relationship between a capacity or potential capacity for cerebral activity and personhood. As I explained in one of my earlier posts, the issue of whether a fetus is a person is distinct from the issue of whether it has a right to continued existence–or, at least, a right that trumps the right of the woman on whose body its life is physically dependent to terminate her pregnancy. I think most Americans are pro-choice both because they view the fetus, except perhaps very late in the pregnancy, as something less than a person and because, except at the margins, they believe the woman’s right to be the greater one. An abortion may be a tragedy, but that doesn’t mean it’s immoral, and it doesn’t mean it should be a criminal offense.
I’d accept the criticisms of my position as fair comment; but suggest that the critics might do well to consider the possibility that our ethical positions ultimately are dependent primarily upon psychological bases. It’s not an approach that appeals to many, and it certainly can prove a quite demanding route to follow; but it does help place our ethical dilemmas in a very different perspective.
Don:
Isn’t it obvious?
It’s not obvious to me. Apart from psychological facts about me, this question is also not taken as being obvious in the considerable literature devoted to discussing the pros and cons of personism. For instance, you’ll find that philosopher and personist Peter Singer adds on a complicated penumbra to his formulation of what counts as a person (which involves the claim that a “person” is someone who actually, as opposed to potentially, exhibits certain kinds of mental function) so that people who are drugged and sleeping come out as persons.
A person who is asleep can wake up. A person who is under anaesthesia can be revived. And cerebral activity is present even in those altered states of consciousness, anyway. A fetus, in contrast, may not even possess the necessary brain tissue for any kind of mental process at all.
People in comas, people who are sleeping, people who are under anaesthesia, and fetuses undergo biochemical changes in their brains over a process of time that lead them to a point where they display the kind of active mental functioning that makes them count as persons (or makes them count as persons for personists). In other words, if you wait long enough, human beings in all these classes exhibit the kind of mental functioning that is supposed to count. The length of time it takes to actively exhibit the latent capacity differs but I don’t know that I would rest a significant moral distinction on length of time.
You note that cerebral activity is present in people who are in comas, sleeping, etc. That type of cerebral activity, to the best of my knowledge, is not the type of cerebral activity that personists typically acknowledge as cerebral activity that earns you personhood status.
As I explained in one of my earlier posts, the issue of whether a fetus is a person is distinct from the issue of whether it has a right to continued existence.
When a distinction between “persons” and “human beings” was introduced in the ethics literature, the point of the distinction was to motivate the claim that some human beings (those who were also “persons”) had a right to continued existence and some human beings (those who were said to not also be “persons”) did not have a right to continued existence. When the personhood distinction is used in the abortion debate, it normally is used to get to some conclusion or other about whether it is morally permissible to destroy fetuses.
I threw in my two cents on the personhood question because that’s the line of reasoning our blog host here was focusing on.
Some people think that it is okay to destroy fetuses even if they count as persons and for them, discussions about who counts as a person and why are irrelevant.
For instance, you say, in changing to a quite different area of debate around abortion, that:
In no area of the law is one person required to make an extraordinary sacrifice, a sacrifice even remotely comparable to enduring nine months of unwanted pregnancy and childbirth, in order to save or sustain the life of another person.
This is essentially the point that Judith Jarvis Thomson makes in her famous violinist analogy. (The violinist is famous and so is the analogy.) However, she advances this claim as a moral one, and not as an inference from existing law.
Her basic idea is that it is morally permissible to kill “innocent aggressors” who threaten us with physical inconvenience.
Under law or morality, I don’t believe that we are typically allowed to do whatever we wish to innocent aggressors who physically inconvenience us.
If you look at the general question of innocent aggressors (it comes up in many areas of ethics)divorced from considerations about fetuses, many people find that their intuition is that we are morally obligated to endure considerable inconvenience in order to avoid killing them.
Emily:
It’s not obvious to me.
Well, the facts that a sleeping person can wake up and that a fetus may not even have any kind of brain at all seem pretty obvious to me. The connection between those facts and whether those organisms have the ‘potential” for cerebral function also seems pretty obvious.
In other words, if you wait long enough, human beings in all these classes exhibit the kind of mental functioning that is supposed to count. The length of time it takes to actively exhibit the latent capacity differs but I don’t know that I would rest a significant moral distinction on length of time.
But the difference is not merely time, it’s whether the organism possesses the necessary physical structures for thought. A sleeping person does. A fetus doesn’t (at least, before a certain stage of development). On your argument, the sperm and egg constitute a “potential” person even before fertilization, since “if you wait long enough” they will also eventually “become” a born human being.
I don’t believe that a pile of metal and plastic is the same thing as a car simply because it has the “potential,” if suitably put together, to become a car. I don’t believe that an acorn is the same thing as an oak tree simply because it has the “potential” to become one. I don’t believe a fetus is a person simply because it has the “potential” to become one. In fact, I think the claim is absurd.
You note that cerebral activity is present in people who are in comas, sleeping, etc. That type of cerebral activity, to the best of my knowledge, is not the type of cerebral activity that personists typically acknowledge as cerebral activity that earns you personhood status.
I’m not sure what a “personist” is. I know of no one who claims that a person ceases to be a person while they are sleeping, on the grounds of changed brain activity or on any other grounds.
Emily:
Some people think that it is okay to destroy fetuses even if they count as persons and for them, discussions about who counts as a person and why are irrelevant.
Yes. If you wish to make that argument, go ahead, and I’ll give you my rebuttal. My point is that your previous post conflated two distinct questions: (1) Is a fetus a person, and (2) Does a fetus have a “right to continued existence” that trumps the right of the woman whose body is sustaining its life to terminate her pregnancy.
This is essentially the point that Judith Jarvis Thomson makes in her famous violinist analogy. (The violinist is famous and so is the analogy.) However, she advances this claim as a moral one, and not as an inference from existing law.
I wasn’t referring to that analogy. I was referring to things like Good Samaritan laws, or life-saving organ donations. In no area of the law is one person required to make a sacrifice even remotely comparable in magnitude to completing an unwanted pregnancy in order to save the life of another person, let alone to save the life of something (e.g., a fetus) that is widely regarded to be much less than a person. We generally think of organ donation by a living person, for example, to be virtuous, even heroic, rather than as something that he has a strong moral obligation to do, let alone something that he should be legally compelled to do. Why should we not view completion of an unwanted pregnancy in the same way?
Her basic idea is that it is morally permissible to kill “innocent aggressors” who threaten us with physical inconvenience. Under law or morality, I don’t believe that we are typically allowed to do whatever we wish to innocent aggressors who physically inconvenience us.
No, we’re not allowed to do “whatever we wish.” But that’s not the issue. The issue is whether a woman should be required to endure the burden of completing an unwanted pregnancy in order to save the life of a fetus. The value of Thomson’s thought experiment is that it illuminates our moral intuitions outside of the specific context of pregnancy. She posits a burden comparable to an unwanted pregnancy (the burden of acting as a physical life-support system for another person by being plugged into their circulatory system) to show that we would not impose such a burden in another context, and thus to show that we should not impose it in the context of pregnancy, even if we do consider the fetus to constitute a person.
Don–
I’m not sure what a “personist” is. I know of no one who claims that a person ceases to be a person while they are sleeping, on the grounds of changed brain activity or on any other grounds.
It’s shorthand in the ethics literature for people who argue that in order to have a right to the highest levels of protection afforded to members of the human moral community, all else being equal, human beings have to be more than just human beings. They also have to be “persons”, where a “person” is someone with (depending on the particular definition) certain psychological characteristics, almost always including some kind of higher mental functioning.
You’re right (I hope) that no one argues that “persons” cease to be “persons” when they are sleeping.
If a moral theory about persons allowed that, that consequence would be considered a reductio of the theory.
The fact that people who advocate personist theories spill intricate ink to maintain that some human beings with latent mental characteristics are still persons even though they are currently unable to exhibit the mental characteristics that would make them count as persons, while other human beings with latent mental characteristics don’t count as persons suggest that these philosophers don’t feel that the question is settled by stoutly and repetitively announcing that the answers are obvious.
Emily:
It’s shorthand in the ethics literature for people who argue that in order to have a right to the highest levels of protection afforded to members of the human moral community, all else being equal, human beings have to be more than just human beings. They also have to be “persons”, where a “person” is someone with (depending on the particular definition) certain psychological characteristics, almost always including some kind of higher mental functioning.
Okay. Then I more or less qualify as a “personist” myself. I think most other people do, too. I think even most anti-abortionists are “personists.” I’ve never met one who advocates consistently treating fetuses as persons. They do not seek to punish abortion as they would punish the killing of an innocent person. They do not seek to punish the destruction of an embryo as they would punish the killing of an innocent person. They do not seek to punish women who physically abuse a fetus as they would punish a woman who physically abused her child. They do not mourn the natural death of an embryo or fetus as they would mourn the natural death of a child. They most often do not seek to punish the abortion of a fetus that resulted from rape at all. In cases where pregnancy threatens a woman’s life, they most often advocate an automatic preference for the woman’s life over the fetus’s life that they would not advocate if the choice were between a woman and her child. And so on and so forth. What these positions betray is that even most of those who claim to believe that a fetus is a person don’t really believe that, and aren’t willing to treat a fetus as the equal of person when confronted with real-world situations that test their claimed beliefs.
The fact that people who advocate personist theories spill intricate ink to maintain that some human beings with latent mental characteristics are still persons even though they are currently unable to exhibit the mental characteristics that would make them count as persons, while other human beings with latent mental characteristics don’t count as persons suggest that these philosophers don’t feel that the question is settled by stoutly and repetitively announcing that the answers are obvious.
I don’t know what supposedly non-obvious “answers” you mean here. The obvious differences between persons in an altered state of consciousness and fetuses that I just described include the facts that a sleeping person can awake, that an anaesthetized person can be revived, and that a fetus may not even possess the necessary physical structures for any kind of mental activity, let alone a cerebrum. You may believe that these differences are irrelevant to questions of personhood, moral status and rights, but you can’t seriously deny that they exist. I rather doubt that the philosophers you are referring to do either.
Don–
Then I more or less qualify as a “personist” myself. I think most other people do, too. I think even most anti-abortionists are “personists.” et seq.
For me, sociological observations are not a good way to decide questions about the moral status of abortion, but I understand that some people do feel comfortable drawing their own epistemic conclusions this way.
You may believe that these differences are irrelevant to questions of personhood, moral status and rights, but you can’t seriously deny that they exist. I rather doubt that the philosophers you are referring to do either.
No one that I know of thinks there are no physical differences between fetuses and people in, say, possibly reversible comas. The question is whether these differences can be captured in a non-arbitrary, non-ad hoc definition of “person” so that people in, say, possibly reversible comas come out as “persons” and fetuses don’t. You seem to be quite fascinated by all these questions and I would urge you to become familiar with the literature on personism.
But the difference is not merely time, it’s whether the organism possesses the necessary physical structures for thought.
Off the top of my head, this seems problematic as a formulation of why some human beings with latent mental function are to be counted as persons and fetuses aren’t.
It would seem to mean that neonates don’t count as persons. It seems to make developmental status bear a moral weight that it doesn’t bear in other areas. It brings in physical characteristics as a way of defining “persons”, against the original project of personism, which is to define persons by observed psychological characteristics, and in this it seems like an ad hoc attempt to avoid problems with counterexamples. It misses the fact that physical changes must occur in any brains with allegedly latent mentality to get those brains to a point where they can display active mentality.
Don–
[Judith Jarvis Thomson] posits a burden comparable to an unwanted pregnancy (the burden of acting as a physical life-support system for another person by being plugged into their circulatory system) to show that we would not impose such a burden in another context, and thus to show that we should not impose it in the context of pregnancy, even if we do consider the fetus to constitute a person.
“Show” is overly optimistic, although I appreciate that you may find her example entirely persuasive.
The question that seems salient to me is what we are morally permitted to do to avoid being a Good Samaritan. We do think it is supererogatory to donate a kidney even when someone will die without it. On the other hand, notions of what is supererogatory have changed a lot since JJT, in a good direction, due to the influence of (some would say, oddly) Peter Singer and Peter Unger, who say that we are morally obligated to live a spartan lifestyle as long as anyone, anywhere in the world would die but for the money we could give to sustain them.
The situation with abortion, though, is about what we are morally permitted to do to another person once we have unwittingly or no been drawn into place as their Good Samaritan.
If we imagine that there’s a hospital that only does kidney dialysis, and that grabs people with healthy kidneys who wonder through the hospital in order to hook them up to dialysis in order to keep sick people alive, there seems to be a moral difference between:
a) Avoiding the hospital altogether.
b) Going to the hospital and taking evasive action when we see orderlies chasing after us with hooks and needles at the ready in order to hook us up to a dialysis machine.
c) Going to the hospital, failing to successfully evade the orderlies, and once we are hooked up, taking out a machine gun and strafing the person hooked up to us.
In no area of the law is one person required to make a sacrifice even remotely comparable in magnitude to completing an unwanted pregnancy in order to save the life of another person.
True, but again, the question is what the law allows us to do to innocent aggressors once certain situations have already occurred. Does the law permit us to use deadly force against aggressors (innocent or not) to repel inconveniences and invasions that are already in place?
Emily:
For me, sociological observations are not a good way to decide questions about the moral status of abortion
They’re not a good way for me either. But the fact that even most abortion opponents have decided that fetuses do not have the moral status of persons suggests that arguments to the contrary are weak. You don’t even seem to believe that fetuses have the moral status of persons yourself.
The question is whether these differences can be captured in a non-arbitrary, non-ad hoc definition of “person” so that people in, say, possibly reversible comas come out as “persons” and fetuses don’t.
I’m not sure what a “non-arbitrary, non-ad hoc definition of person” is supposed to mean. “Personhood” isn’t an empirical fact. It’s an abstract concept. It’s not something we can discover, it’s something we choose to attribute to some entities and not others. In that sense, all definitions of person are arbitrary. A definition that includes coma patients and excludes fetuses on the basis of differences in physical and mental characteristics between those two types of being is no more arbitrary than a definition that, say, includes fertilized eggs and excludes unfertilized ones on the basis of physical differences.
It would seem to mean that neonates don’t count as persons.
No it wouldn’t. Neonates possess a cerebrum and clearly have the capacity for cerebral activity. Young fetuses, on the other hand, do not.
It seems to make developmental status bear a moral weight that it doesn’t bear in other areas. It brings in physical characteristics as a way of defining “persons”, against the original project of personism, which is to define persons by observed psychological characteristics, and in this it seems like an ad hoc attempt to avoid problems with counterexamples. It misses the fact that physical changes must occur in any brains with allegedly latent mentality to get those brains to a point where they can display active mentality.
Again, it’s hard to know what this means. There are “observed psychological differences” between fetuses at different stages of development, and between fetuses and babies, and between fetuses and sleeping adults, and between fetuses and anaesthetized adults. Obviously, then, under a definition of person that rests in part on “psychological” characteristics, babies or sleeping adults may qualify as persons and fetuses may not. Or mature fetuses may qualify and immature ones may not. It all depends on what characteristics the definition requires.
Emily:
The question that seems salient to me is what we are morally permitted to do to avoid being a Good Samaritan. We do think it is supererogatory to donate a kidney even when someone will die without it. On the other hand, notions of what is supererogatory have changed a lot since JJT, in a good direction, due to the influence of (some would say, oddly) Peter Singer and Peter Unger, who say that we are morally obligated to live a spartan lifestyle as long as anyone, anywhere in the world would die but for the money we could give to sustain them. The situation with abortion, though, is about what we are morally permitted to do to another person once we have unwittingly or no been drawn into place as their Good Samaritan.
That’s only true if the fetus is a person, which, as I have explained, few if any people really seem to believe. Even if a fetus is a person, it’s the same situation as Thomson’s thought experiment. If one person is not morally obligated to use their body as a physical life support system for another person in Thomson’s scenario, why are they morally obligated to use their body as a physical life support system for a fetus? Even if there is a moral obligation, why should that obligation be compelled by criminal law?
If we imagine that there’s a hospital that only does kidney dialysis, and that grabs people with healthy kidneys who wonder through the hospital in order to hook them up to dialysis in order to keep sick people alive, there seems to be a moral difference between:
a) Avoiding the hospital altogether.
b) Going to the hospital and taking evasive action when we see orderlies chasing after us with hooks and needles at the ready in order to hook us up to a dialysis machine.
c) Going to the hospital, failing to successfully evade the orderlies, and once we are hooked up, taking out a machine gun and strafing the person hooked up to us.
If there is a point to the above, I have no idea what it is. Do you believe that people have a moral obligation to undergo dialysis to keep sick people alive? Do you believe that people have a moral obligation to donate a kidney or other tissue to keep sick people alive? If you do believe there is a moral obligation in either case, do you think it should be compelled by law?
True, but again, the question is what the law allows us to do to innocent aggressors once certain situations have already occurred.
Suppose a child is sick and needs a kidney transplant to survive. The child’s parent is the only match. Without the transplant, the child will die. Do you think the law should compel the parent to donate a kidney? If not, why should the law compel a woman to complete a pregnancy?
Does the law permit us to use deadly force against aggressors (innocent or not) to repel inconveniences and invasions that are already in place?
I don’t really understand the question. What kind of “inconveniences and evasions” do you mean? What do you mean by “that are already in place?” In a situation in which one person is required to make an extraordinary sacrifice to save the life of another person, the law does not require them to do so. We are not legally required to donate tissue or organs, even if another person will die without them. We are not legally required to jump into a river to save a drowning man. Why, then, should a woman be legally required to endure an unwanted pregnancy and unwanted childbirth?
By the way, Laurence Tribe, a Harvard constitutional law professor, has a lengthy discussion of the Good Samaritan doctrine in his book Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes. The following is taken from that text:
In Anglo-American law there is no general duty to give of yourself to rescue another… [In 1908] Professor James Barr Ames suggested that a person should be required to “save another from impending death or great bodily harm, when he might do so with little or no inconvenience to himself.” But even this apparently modest rule met with overwhelming opposition. Would one to whom ten dollars meant nothing, it was asked, be under a legal obligation to save the life of a hungry child in a foreign land? Should this be a legal duty or a matter of charity?
No state in the United States has adopted even Ames’ suggestion for a modest departure from the common law rule. Only Vermont and Minnesota impose any duty to rescue, and only in the strictest jurisdiction, Vermont, does the average person now have a duty, whenever he knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm, to give reasonable assistance. And even then, he need give assistance only to the extent it “can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important duties to others.” The penalty for failing to give such aid: a fine of not more than one hundred dollars.
…Although the relationship between parent and child carries more legal obligation than the relationship between two strangers, nowhere do we require a voluntary parent to make, for an already born child, the kind of sacrifice some would have us impose on the pregnant woman in the name of the fetus. Imagine, for example, a little girl who needs a liver transplant. Even if, because of tissue type, only her father can provide a segment of liver that her body will not reject, our laws have never required any such sacrifice of him.
way too much to read here… so I’m not going to try. Rob – you’ve taken the same approach that I have, and the same approach that I believe I’ve mentioned on your site previously. I understand brain waives stopping indicates end of life, and brain waves start after the first trimester. Ta dah.
Don P argued the case in far more detail than I had time to do- so thanks Don!!
I think that these arguments are fascinating and relevant in terms of the morality of abortion, and it’s great that that is still happening. The point that Don made very well is that morals and law are two different things. In most instances we don’t, and shouldn’t, legislate morality. And the law has no right to force women into making choices this important.
The other thing that comes from recognising that giving birth is too big a thing to force women to do, is that it also does more to recognise the value of motherhood- more than forcing pregnancies will do.
It may sound unconvincing to some, but I believe being pro-choice does more to respect life than forcing pregnancies will. It recognises that quality, not quantity, is important, and there is nothing more fundamental to quality of life than the ability to make genuine choices. There seems very little point in protecting the lives of foetuses, just to bring them into a world where their judgement is considered to be inferior, and their bodies are considered to be public property.
Don P.–
Larry Tribe’s work isn’t taken seriously in the realm of ethical/moral philosophy, even by those philosophers who share his belief that abortion should be legal.
You mentioned that you don’t understand the kidney dialysis example. This is an example that is occasionally used as an intuition pump in the literature about innocent aggressors. (I.e., the literature written in the analytical philosophy tradition).
Most universities offer courses in contemporary moral issues, and these courses often include a multi-week examination of the issues involved here. Becoming familiar with this source material helps people become more aware of the nuances of dialogues around abortion.
I don’t know if you live near a university, but many of them allow people to sit in on courses, sometimes for no fee.
Reading Material Du Jour
Robert Corr analyzes the two sides of the secular abortion debate and manages to change his mind within a 24-hour period. This is why research rocks. Erika at SnazzyKat points us toward a nasty Boston archbishop who says that feminists are evil. Evil! …
Some more stuff Amp is reading
Just a few links hanging around on my desktop… Take the LGF Quiz: Little Green Footballs or late German Fascists? I have a reason to live! Only three weeks until the new Stephen Sondheim album is released! A New York…
Abortion, Sex Ed, and Religious Morality: A Futile Debate?
At After Abortion, the debate wages on. My civility is quickly getting frayed at the edges. One reason that I asked for the input on abortion rights was to see if anyone had original commentary on why the procedure should be legal and/or illegal. Only …
Sexual Politics and Religious Morality: A Futile Debate?
Originally posted April 21, 2004 At After Abortion, the debate wages on. My civility is quickly getting frayed at the edges. One reason that I asked for the input on abortion rights was to see if anyone had original commentary on why the procedure shou…
The problem in using the personality, or the complex cerebral cortex as the demarcation of personhood is that it is utterly arbitrary. The potential for both exists at the the two week stage if not fully developed. So what, you might ask. Well, what if we decide to use language for instance as the cutoff. Use of complex language is after all one of the ‘properties’ that truly differentiates humans from animals, so why not use this. Because it then pushes personhood outside the womb. Use of complex language isn’t present until about 2 years. So should be be able to snuff out a 1 year old? I think the weakness of using an arbitrary definition based on the level of complexity in development is obvioius in this case. I can’t see how the arbitrary use of the complex cerebral cortex is any differnent in principle.