Steve Edwards has a plan
Steve Edwards talks sense on Aceh (and other areas, like Sri Lanka):
Access and information are the two most important assets. You need to gradually roll back the operating zone of both the military and the militias by getting a toe-hold and pushing the boundaries where possible. That could mean obtaining a mandate for outside humanitarian access, and simply flooding the place with NGO staff and journalists. Tacitly, you are using aid workers as human shields against the belligerent parties. In turn, the disputants do not want to exhaust their political capital by lashing out at each other, the civilians, or the aid workers, because they know the world is watching this time.
The best solution is for the US and Australian troops to deliver most of the aid (in concert with NGOs), while gradually easing the TNI forces out of any position where they could either siphon off the supplies or seek a decisive battlefield victory (with all the horrors that would entail) while their opponents are weak. By taking the delivery of aid out of the TNI’s hands, we will maximise the impact of our taxpayer dollars.
It is extremely unlikely that responsibility for aid delivery will be removed from the TNI. Australia’s troops are too busy losing Iraq, so we are only sending about 500 compared to tens of thousands of Indonesians. As a result, the most important thing is forcing the region open to independent aid workers, journalists and human rights observors. The army won’t like it, but frankly we shouldn’t care too much if they complain about being watched while they work.
Update: The Sydney Morning Herald carries an excellent piece by Matthew Moore and Karuni Rompies. It captures the tension between the TNI, who want the outsiders to leave as soon as possible, and the NGOs and Acehnese activists who want them to settle in for the long term.
It would be even better if the Islamic fundamentalist separatists could be eased out of any position which might make them able to impose Shari’a Law on Aceh.
In this particular conflict, there are no good guys — only two different brands of bad guys: the TNI and the GAM.
I’ve got to say, EP, the Acehnese Islam that I’ve read about is not what you’re suggesting. My understanding is that although they are conservative, they are not much different to the Catholic conservatism of the East Timorese (which, while I disagree with it, I do not consider a fundamental threat to democracy).
The threat of evil fundamentalism appears to be from the groups whose entry into the region has been sponsored by the TNI in recent days:
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For the record Rob, there is a very very small number of Australian troops still in Iraq, not many were comitted in the first place and most of them were SAS or Navy – and the Navy are actually doing useful things over there. The Iraq occupation force is almost soley US/UK forces with some other countries thrown in – most of whom have more in there than Australia.
I hope you’re right about the GAM, Rob. Of course, it’s possible that their top priority now is defeating the TNI, rather than strict enforcement of religious law — if they win independence, priorities may change.
On the other hand, the US/Australian influence would tend to support democratic choices by the locals, while trying not to inflame either the TNI or the fundamentalists.
Sensible enough, but there are several considerations here. Firstly, we are giving a substantial sum of aid to Aceh, and it would be pointless (and horrifying) to see any infrastructure we build get knocked down by belligerents. Secondly, neither GAM nor the TNI is going to “end” the war (through victory or compromise), because neither party has an interest in doing so. That means third parties have a role to play. And the more video cameras, the better.